CHAPTER 3: GOD'S NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES
The Simplicity of God
FOURTH ARTICLE
WHETHER ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE ARE THE SAME IN GOD (cont)
Second proof. It has its foundation in the principle that God is pure act, and is as follows: Existence is compared to essence, which is a distinct reality from it, as actuality to potentiality; but, God is pure act, in whom there is no potentiality; therefore God's essence, is not potentiality for existence, but is identical with existence. The major is the very definition of esse or existence. It is that which makes every form or nature actual. Thus humanity is not spoken of as actual except so far as it is spoken of as existing.
The minor was proved in the first article of this question. The reason given was that, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality, since a being is said to be in potentiality with reference to its actuality, and is not reduced into actuality except by some being in actuality. But God is the first Being (fourth way). Therefore nothing of potentiality is in Him, but He is pure act. This is also evident from the fact that God is the first Mover, the first Cause, the first necessary Being. God must be His action, and hence His own existence, because operation follows existence, and the mode of operation the mode of existence. This argument points out the one end to which these three proofs for God's existence converge.
Corollary. Therefore in everything that is caused by God, essence is potentiality with reference to existence, and hence is really distinct from it, just as matter is from form. Before the consideration of our mind, matter is not form, but is potency that is made actual by its form, and hence is really distinct from it. In like manner, the essence of a caused thing is not its existence, previous to the mind's consideration of this. In other words, it is not identical with its existence, but is distinct from it previous to the mind's consideration. Therefore this distinction, however slight it may appear, is real. The angel, knowing its own essence directly, sees this to be distinct from its existence. From this it is already apparent that there can be only one essence that is existence itself., for multiplication presupposes participation. Thus participated existence is manifold, as the existence of a stone, of a plant, of an animal, of a man.
Third proof. It is derived from the principle that God is the first Being (fourth way). That which is essential being is its own existence; but God is essential being, since He is the first being; therefore
God is His own existence.
The minor presents no difficulty, for it is the terminus of the fourth way in proving God's existence. The major is declared as follows: "That which has existence, but is not existence, is a being by participation," just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, as a coal fire, is on fire by participation. Therefore, "that a thing be essential being, it must be its own existence."
We have in this argument a transcendent confirmation of the principle of efficient causality. This principle, which is invoked in proving
God's existence, is thus formulated: Some other being is the efficient cause of every contingent being. It is commonly held among scholastics that an uncaused contingent being is a contradiction in terms, that is, it is something not only unintelligible (which Kant admits), but is also an absurdity and an absolute impossibility, as for instance, that Lucifer originates from nothing, without any efficient cause.
However, an "uncaused contingent being" is not so clearly repugnant to reason as a "caused non-contingent being"; to say that it is uncaused is not a direct denial of the definition of contingent being, but of its property. "The uncaused contingent being" would be neither self-existent nor dependent on another for existence, and the proposition "the uncaused contingent being exists," would be the affirmation of the positive agreement between two terms that in no way agree. Hence what exists, but is not self-existent, depends on another for its existence.
But for now it is said that the contingent being has existence and is not its existence. Therefore it is participated being, and hence it depends on the essential Being. The idea of participated being, however, is not completely intelligible apart from the correlative idea of essential Being. Therefore it is better to use this term after and not before before the proofs for God's existence. Plato, indeed, practically started out with this notion of being but, on account of his extreme realism, he thought he had a certain intuition of the supreme Good, or of God.
St. Thomas, in accordance with moderate realism, makes use of this notion of participated being preferably after the proofs of God's existence. Then the principle of causality receives its confirmation as from a transcendent source, since participated being is shown to be dependent on essential being, or being composed of potency and act on pure act.
Corollary. Father del Prado (21) concludes from this argument that the division of real being into essential being and participated being has its root in the distinction between the self-subsisting Being and that which is composed of essence and existence.
In this distinction we have the foundation for the refutation of pantheism. For if God is the self-subsisting Being, then nothing can be added to His being, (22) because He is ultimate actuality. Hence there can be no accident in God (23) because the self-subsisting Being is not capable of further determination, but is the maximum in determination, although not limited, for limitation is on the part of matter that receives the form, or of essence that receives existence. From this we have the refutation of absolute evolutionism, according to which God is becoming in the world, and of Spinoza according to whom God is the recipient of finite modes that are, as it were, His accidents. Neoplatonic emanatism is likewise virtually refuted. This theory states that the soul is not made, not created out of nothing, but is "of God's substance," generated, as it were, from God. St. Thomas says in contradiction to this: "The soul is not its own existence, but is a being by participation. Therefore it is not a pure act like God." (24) Hence it is not the same as God's nature, and therefore is not generated from Him, is not of His substance, because generation is the origin of a living being from a living principle in the likeness of nature(25), Thus man generates man, and as stated in revelation, God the Father generates the Son in the likeness of His nature, communicating to Him even the whole of His indivisible nature, which cannot be multiplied.
Thus we readily see from this that pantheism, by confusing God with the creature, must end either in the absorption of the world in God, as in the acosmism of Parmenides, or else in the absorption of God in the world, as in the absolute evolutionism of Heraclitus and of several modern philosophers.
There are other corollaries to which Father del Prado alludes,(26) such as that the real distinction between created essence and existence is the foundation of the division of real created being according to the various grades of perfection, for the formal concept of existence does not denote either imperfection or limitations, and it is not susceptible to divers limitations in the stone, the plant, the animal, and man, unless it is received in some subject, namely, in some essence which is capable of existing, or in which there is a real capacity for existence, just as in matter there is a real capacity for its form, which is received in it and thus limited by it. Hence the various grades of being or of perfection are the result of the diversity of participation in being. Thus the fourth way of proving God's existence is illustrated from a transcendent source, namely, from the grades of being.
Finally, in accordance with this doctrine of a real distinction between created essence and existence, which Suarez rashly rejected,
Thomas admits one existence for the composite of matter and form, although the essence is composite, that is, the parts of the essence (matter and form) have not partial existences. Thus the unity of the natural composite is much better safeguarded. There is one existence even in the human composite; and the soul, which is essentially subsistent and immortal, will again communicate its existence to the reassumed body on the resurrection day. Moreover, as St. Thomas teaches, there is one existence for the two natures in Christ, which is the divine existence.(27) All these things presuppose that created essence is really distinct from its existence. And this is the corollary of the conclusion of this article, namely, that only in God are essence and existence identical.
Hence this truth is rightly termed by Father del Prado (28) the fundamental truth of Christian philosophy, fundamental indeed, not by way of investigation (which starts from facts attested by experience and the first principles of reason), but by way of judgment, by which wisdom judges of all things from the highest reason and
cause.
Father del Prado expressly says: "This is the primary fundamental truth of Christian philosophy, not by way of investigation by which the mind ascends from creatures to God but by way of judgment, since we decide about those things and resolve the truth of our knowledge into its ultimate causes, and we seek for the ultimate reason why there must be only one unrelated absolute immutable being that is endowed with every perfection, and why all other beings except this one have received and must receive both what they have and desire to have, because of their absolute dependence on the first Being from whom, through whom, and in whom are all things." (29)
Thus it is apparent why the proper name of God is "Who is" or "I am who am," and why God said to St. Catherine of Siena: "I am who am; thou art who art not," because, as St. Augustine says, creatures in comparison to God are as if they did not exist. For after creation, although there are more beings, there is not more of being or more of perfection.
Hence with good reason Father del Prado says: "All those things that are set forth by St. Thomas in his first consideration of the one God are contained fundamentally, virtually, and as to their beginnings, in the third article of the second question, and the subsequent questions are but explanations of those five ways by which God's existence can be proved. And the golden key of entrance in the explanation of these proofs is presented by St. Thomas in the fourth article of the third question, where he gives many reasons why it is impossible for God's existence to differ from His essence. In this we have the secret for finding out not what constitutes but rather what does not constitute the nature of the one who is the mover, the causer, the necessary in being, the maximum in being and in intelligence. In this we have the scientific foundation of the whole treatise on the one God. This constitutes the cornerstone of all subsequent statements, namely, the identity of essence and existence in God,(30) and in God alone.
Footnotes
21. Op. Cit., p. 329.
22. Summa theol., Ia, q.3, a.4 ad 1um.
23. Ibid., a.6.
24. Ibid., q.90, a.1 ad 2um.
25. Ibid., q. 27, a.2.
26. Loc. cit.
27. Summa theol., IIIa, q. 17, a.2.
28. Loc. cit.
29. Ibid., p. 372.
30. Ibid, p. 469. |
